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  • On the impossibility of Skipping Christmas

    An existentialist reading of John Grisham’s holiday story

    In John Grisham’s Skipping Christmas, we encounter what seems at first a lighthearted holiday farce: Luther and Nora Krank’s comic rebellion against the season’s pressures. Tired of the frenetic decorating, the obligatory parties, and the commercial frenzy, the Kranks hatch a plan to do the unthinkable in their closely-knit suburban community – they will skip Christmas entirely. With their only daughter Blair away on a Peace Corps assignment in Peru, they see a rare opportunity. Instead of the usual yuletide marathon of buying and bedecking, they book a Caribbean cruise. For once, they’ll trade snowmen and Santa hats for sun-soaked beaches and piña coladas, attempting a bold escape from what Luther views as the hubbub of holiday obligation. It’s a decision made half in jest and half in earnest, born of exhaustion with the mandatory cheer that December demands. Grisham narrates their resolve with a curmudgeonly wit – Luther tallying up last year’s $6,000+ Christmas bill, aghast at how little they have to show for it, and Nora tentatively agreeing to this grand holiday boycott. Their pact is sealed with a mix of giddy trepidation and jaded justification: after all, what is Christmas without family at home? A quieter, simpler 10-day cruise seems not only harmless but healing. For a moment, reading of their plan, one can’t help but root for the Kranks’ audacity. In a world of inflatable reindeer and forced smiles, who hasn’t fantasized about sailing away from it all?

    Yet, as the Kranks soon discover, skipping Christmas is easier said than done. The moment their neighbors get wind of Luther and Nora’s intended defection from holiday norms, a fierce backlash ensues. Hemlock Street, ordinarily a friendly suburb festooned with lights, becomes a battleground of conformity versus individual choice. The Kranks’ modest rebellion – simply not putting up decorations or buying a tree – is met with passive-aggressive dismay and outright peer pressure. Vic Frohmeyer, the neighborhood’s self-appointed holiday watchdog, rallies the block into action. One morning the Kranks step outside to find an army of frosty-faced carolers serenading (or rather, besieging) their lawn, belting out Christmas songs as if music might bludgeon them into compliance. Children build an eerie snowman “Frosty” effigy on their lawn and chant for the Kranks to join in the decorating contest. Phone calls come at all hours, cajoling and then demanding they “decorate their house!” Picket signs sprout on their sidewalk imploring them not to ruin the street’s chance at the coveted “best-decorated block” prize. Even local institutions turn on them: the Boy Scouts are scandalized that the Kranks won’t buy a tree this year; the police and firemen, who fundraise with calendars and fruitcakes, treat their refusal as a personal affront. Neighbors who once chatted over fences now glare with open hostility at the dark, undecorated Krank house. In Grisham’s comedic telling, these scenes provoke laughter at the overzealousness of holiday devotees. But beneath the humor lies a palpable pressure – a demand for conformity so intense it’s absurd. The Kranks find themselves ostracized for opting out, labeled practically un-American for daring not to celebrate Christmas in the prescribed way. Their quiet act of non-participation has made them outcasts in their own community.

    As Christmas Eve dawns, Luther and Nora stand firm (if nervously) amid the mounting disapproval. Their flight to the Caribbean leaves the next morning; freedom is so close they can taste the salt air. They’ve endured the neighborhood’s scorn and even chuckled privately at the ridiculous lengths to which people go to enforce holiday cheer. It appears they might actually succeed in their anti-Christmas escapade. But then, with cruelly perfect timing, the phone rings. It’s their daughter Blair calling from Miami – surprise – she’s coming home for Christmas after all. Not only that, she’s bringing her new fiancé to introduce him to her family and the beloved Kranks’ Christmas traditions she’s been bragging about. In an instant, Luther and Nora’s dream of a peaceful island retreat crashes down. Nora’s maternal instincts and social reflexes kick in; when Blair innocently asks if they’re having their usual annual Christmas Eve party, Nora’s voice betrays not a hint of the truth. “Yes, of course we are!” she exclaims, her heart pounding with panic even as the words leave her lips. Luther’s face falls; all he can manage is a silent, incredulous stare as his carefully rationalized plans evaporate. In a matter of seconds, the Kranks’ resolute stance against Christmas buckles under the weight of a single expectation – their daughter’s.

    What follows is pure comic mayhem on the surface, but one can’t miss the bitter irony underneath. With only a few hours’ notice, the Kranks must now conjure Christmas from thin air. Luther, who gleefully didn’t bother to buy a tree, scrambles to find one on Christmas Eve (an impossible quest as every lot is sold out, forcing him into farcical extremes like stealing a neighbor’s discarded spruce). Nora races to put up decorations they swore they wouldn’t need, frantically dusting off ornaments and lights from storage. Neighbors who moments ago were vilifying them suddenly become their saviors – albeit with a touch of smug satisfaction – as they band together to help the hapless couple restore the normal order. A mob of residents strings lights on the Kranks’ gutters, finds a spare tree, sets up the giant Frosty on their roof, and even rustles up food for the once-cancelled party. In the chaotic rush, Luther manages to injure himself (dangling absurdly from the roof with Frosty’s electric cord around his leg until rescued). The police, who earlier frowned at the Kranks’ lack of community spirit, now grandly escort Blair and her fiancé from the airport in a festive convoy, sirens blazing like ersatz sleigh bells, so that the returning daughter sees every house on Hemlock Street – including her own – aglow and joyful. It’s as if the entire neighborhood conspires to conceal the Kranks’ attempted mutiny, swiftly erasing every sign of it. And it works: Blair arrives to a picture-perfect Christmas, none the wiser that her parents nearly escaped this tableau. The party that night is a roaring success by conventional standards – laughter, carols, neighbors shoulder-to-shoulder raising eggnog toasts. Luther and Nora, exhausted and dazed, are swept up into the very celebration they swore off, now seemingly grateful captives of the holiday spirit.

    Most readers likely breathe a sigh of relief at this ending. Grisham delivers all the comforting notes of a holiday tale: estranged community members coming together, family reunited, generosity triumphing. We’re meant to see Luther’s transformation from Scrooge-like curmudgeon to benevolent neighbor as the satisfying moral arc. After all, he even gives away the non-refundable cruise tickets to an elderly neighbor – Walt Scheel and his cancer-stricken wife – in a final act of selflessness on Christmas morn. It’s a scene that checks every box: redemption, community, self-sacrifice. Many close the book smiling, thinking the Kranks learned the true meaning of Christmas, which (as every pop-culture holiday story insists) lies in togetherness and altruism rather than personal indulgence. On the surface, Grisham seems to be affirming that no matter how harebrained or stingy a scheme may start, the warmth of family and neighbors can set things right in the end. Luther’s icy resolve melts; Nora’s initial misgivings about skipping the holiday prove justified; and their earlier defiance is gently chastened as foolishness. It reads, in one sense, as a celebration of community and tradition prevailing over individual whim.

    But let’s pause and consider this narrative from another angle. Step back from the twinkling lights and triumphant carols, and a different message glimmers in the story – one perhaps not intentionally woven, but revealed in the very fabric of the Kranks’ experience. Under the wry comedy lies a piercing truth about societal expectations: we are bound, often uncomfortably, to the obligations and expectations of others. In fact, one might argue we have misread Grisham’s intention or at least the novel’s ultimate implications. Instead of a simple parable championing holiday spirit, Skipping Christmas can be seen as an inadvertent cautionary tale about the near impossibility of escaping collective norms. The comedic resolution, rather than being purely heartwarming, hints at a sobering reality: even our personal choices are not made in a vacuum; the world around us may refuse to let us stray too far from its scripts.

    Throughout the story, every effort Luther and Nora make to assert their independence is met with resistance bordering on tyranny – all disguised as good cheer and neighborly concern. Their initially innocent decision to abstain from Christmas exposes the startling truth that conformity is often enforced by those around us with almost moral fervor. The neighbors’ outrage isn’t because the Kranks harmed anyone; it’s because they dared to be different. By merely saying “no, thanks” to a community ritual, the Kranks highlight how ritual can shift from joyous choice to oppressive requirement. Hemlock Street’s reaction is practically tribal: the Kranks have threatened a cherished collective value, and the tribe mobilizes to correct or crush the deviance. This undercurrent in the novel lays bare an uncomfortable sentiment: in our communities (be it a small neighborhood or society at large), there is immense pressure to play along, to do what is expected, lest you become an outsider. We often praise traditions as the glue that binds us, but here we see the binding can feel more like shackles to those who don’t fit the mold.

    Grisham’s story, intentionally or not, illuminates the tension between individual freedom and social expectation. Luther Krank’s quixotic quest to reclaim Christmas on his own terms – to say that he owes nothing to December but what he chooses – is met with something akin to forceful correction by his peers. And when even his beloved daughter unwittingly joins the chorus of expectation, the fight is effectively over. The message one might draw is not “Community is wonderful” (though the narrative overtly delivers that), but rather “Resistance is futile.” The Kranks tried to swim against the current and were swiftly swept back to shore by a tidal wave of tradition. In this reading, Skipping Christmas becomes a commentary on how frighteningly easy it is to be pulled back into line by the combined weight of others’ desires and judgments. The final image of Luther, bruised and emotionally beaten, handing away his cruise tickets – the very symbol of his attempted freedom – to console a neighbor is a poignant one. On the one hand, it’s charity and kindness; on the other, it’s Luther’s surrender. He gives away his escape hatch, accepting that his fate is to endure the same Christmas he once tried to avoid. It’s a bittersweet capitulation: touching in its generosity, yet heavy with the sense that his personal choice never really stood a chance.

    If we peer at the Kranks’ saga through an existentialist lens, this tale of a canceled Caribbean Christmas becomes more than just slapstick comedy – it transforms into a small tragedy of the human condition. Existentialist thought prizes individual freedom, authenticity, and the courage to create one’s own meaning in a world that often feels saturated with prescribed narratives. Luther’s impulse to skip Christmas was, in essence, an existential act of rebellion: he sought authenticity. Rather than mindlessly reenacting the role of the jolly neighbor with the gaudy decorations – a role he found suddenly hollow without his daughter – he attempted to redefine what the holiday would mean for him and Nora. In that moment, Luther assumed the stance of what Sartre or Camus might call the individual asserting meaning in an absurd world. Why string up lights or endure the chaos if it brings no joy or purpose to them this year? Why not chase a different kind of happiness, one born of their own choice rather than tradition’s tempo? His plan was a declaration: our value this Christmas will be rest, intimacy, adventure – not shopping and ornamentation. It was personal meaning over collective meaning.

    But true freedom, as existentialists often lament, is a frighteningly heavy burden. The Kranks face the daunting reality that living authentically – stepping off the well-trodden path – may isolate you from others. The formidable backlash of their community is the price exacted for daring to choose differently. Here, we witness an almost textbook case of what existential philosophers call living in “bad faith” versus embracing authenticity. Initially, Luther refuses to live in bad faith; he won’t go through the motions just because that is what one does at Christmas. He rejects the script that society handed him, searching for a self-determined path. However, by the end, overwhelmed by external pressure, he relinquishes that authenticity. In existential terms, he falls into bad faith – telling himself he “has no choice” but to comply, performing the expected role as everyone nods approvingly. The neighbors, the charities, even his own daughter’s expectations become the “They” that Heidegger described: the amorphous social force dictating what is acceptable. And the Kranks, unable to withstand the loneliness of standing apart, ultimately succumb to the comfort of belonging at the cost of their individual resolve.

    What’s particularly illuminating is how emotionally conflicted this succumbing feels, even amid the ostensibly happy ending. The narrative wraps it in joy – Luther and Nora dancing at their resurrected party, their daughter beaming – yet one senses Luther’s inner turmoil. Grisham’s prose (under its comedic sheen) leaves room for Luther’s subtle realization that all the forces he raged against won in the end. That moment when he sits quietly by the window, after the party winds down, watching the snow settle on the houses, you can almost imagine him reflecting: had anything truly changed? He tried to break free from the “frenzy”, and here it is around him again, as if his revolt was a mere dream. This is the existential quandary at its core – the pull between one’s own will and the weight of others’ wills. Skipping Christmas inadvertently asks, in the end, how much of our lives do we really own, and how much do we simply rent from tradition and expectation?

    With that question in mind, consider what an ideal Christmas story might look like for an existential hero. It would not be one that reinforces “everyone else’s idea of a perfect holiday,” but one that validates personal choice and freedom. Imagine, for a moment, a different ending for the Kranks. Not a comedic reversal, not a surrender to the predictable warmth of community approval – but something quieter, braver, and perhaps, in its own way, profoundly hopeful. In this alternate denouement, Luther and Nora gently inform their surprised daughter that they love her dearly, but this year will indeed be different – they have made plans, plans that matter to them. They invite her to join in their adventure or to celebrate in her own way, but they do not apologize for carving out a Christmas on their terms. There might be hurt feelings or confusion at first, but in time Blair might understand that her parents, as individuals, have needs and longings beyond the roles of Mom and Dad hosting a party. And so, on Christmas morning, instead of frantically stirring eggnog and roasting a last-minute turkey, Luther and Nora Krank find themselves aboard a gently rocking cruise ship on the Caribbean Sea.

    Picture them on the deck at sunrise: the sky a tender pink, the air warm with salt and possibility. Nora’s hand rests in Luther’s and there’s a quiet smile playing on her lips – not the strained smile of forced merriment at a neighborhood gathering, but the relaxed contentment of someone who has stepped out of the noise and found a bit of peace. Luther breathes in, deeply, freely, the tropical breeze filling his lungs as he realizes this is Christmas Day. There are no carolers at his door, no garish lights – only the soft crash of waves against the hull and perhaps the distant cry of a seabird. In that simplicity, he discovers a new kind of holiday spirit: one that isn’t dictated by ritual or expectation, but by authentic desire. Maybe he raises a toast with Nora – not to defying anyone or proving a point, but simply to the joy of reclaiming their time and celebrating on their own terms.

    This ending would not have the loud fanfare of a community chorus or a police escort with flashing lights. Its miracle would be quieter: the Kranks, still together, still in love, enjoying the rare and precious gift of personal freedom. No one applauds them for it; no one needs to. In this version, Christmas isn’t “saved” – because it was never lost. It was whatever they chose it to be: a day like any other, made special only by the meaning they gave it. Such a conclusion might not satisfy those craving the sugary rush of a conventional Christmas tale. It lacks the snow and the big family tableau, the scene of neighbors crowding warmly into the living room. Instead, it offers something else – a reaffirmation that individuals can choose their path, even amid the collective roar of tradition. It suggests that sometimes the most profound validation comes not from conforming to expectations, but from quietly, steadfastly being true to oneself.

    In reality, of course, the Kranks didn’t board that plane. Their story ended nestled back in the familiar bosom of community, for better or worse. But reflecting on the tale with an existential sensibility, one finds that it raises a thought-provoking paradox: Is the happiest ending necessarily the most authentic one? Grisham’s novel ostensibly concludes with joy because the Kranks rejoin the fold. Yet the lingering resonance – the part that stays with a reader like a faint bittersweet aftertaste – is that they were on the brink of a very different kind of happiness, one born from self-determination. In a perfect world, perhaps Luther and Nora could have had both – their daughter’s love and understanding, and the freedom of that long-dreamed cruise. Life, however, often demands choices that please others at the expense of our own plans.

    And so, the tale of the Kranks leaves us with a gentle, poignant lesson, one that cuts deeper than the tinsel-bright surface might suggest. We laugh at their antics, we sympathize with their plight, and ultimately we accept their capitulation as a necessity – because given the circumstances, what else could they do? But maybe, just maybe, Skipping Christmas invites us to question those very circumstances. It challenges us, in its roundabout witty way, to ask why opting out was ever seen as an affront in the first place. Why do we feel so threatened when someone chooses a path different from our own, especially in something as personal as how to spend a holiday? The Kranks’ story implies that the strongest chains are often the invisible ones of expectation, forged link by link through years of “this is just how things are done.”

    In the final analysis, John Grisham’s little holiday comedy carries an unexpected weight. It reminds us that our lives are often entangled in each other’s expectations, and extricating oneself, even for a short while, can be an ordeal. Perhaps Grisham intended nothing more than to amuse, to spin a silly yarn about skipping one Christmas. But within that yarn, like a bright thread, is the idea that freedom can be both alluring and frightening – and that society will always have its say. The Kranks tried to escape Christmas, and in doing so, revealed how inescapable our social bonds really are.

    One closes the book smiling at the happy ending, yes, but also pondering: who was right – the spirited neighbors who imposed their will out of genuine (if overbearing) love of tradition, or the Kranks, who for a moment asserted the radical notion that they didn’t have to do what was expected of them? There is no easy answer. Yet an existential reading tips the sympathy towards the latter. It mourns, quietly, the freedom they almost had and didn’t, in the end, dare to keep. It suggests that the most poignant Christmas story is not the one where everything goes back to normal, but the one where two people find the courage to shape their own normal.

    In that sense, the ideal Christmas story lurking in Skipping Christmas’ shadows is a brave little fable of liberation: Luther and Nora Krank, tickets in hand, truly skipping Christmas and discovering that the world doesn’t end when they do. Such a story would not condemn community or family – it would simply affirm that love and understanding can encompass even the choice to celebrate differently. It would trust that Blair, the loving daughter, could come home to find her parents gone and still feel their love in the choices they made for themselves, perhaps even respect them for it. It would show neighbors waving goodbye without resentment, even if they don’t fully understand. In that world, the Kranks depart, and maybe it’s a quieter Christmas on Hemlock Street that year, but life goes on. The sun still rises on December 25th, the neighbors still have their own celebrations, and Luther and Nora create a new memory together under a tropical sky.

    Such an ending is not what Grisham gave us, but it lingers as an exquisite “what if.” It speaks to the heart of existential thought: that in choosing our own path, we seize responsibility for our life’s meaning. The Kranks’ cruise would have been more than a vacation – it would have been a statement that their Christmas belongs to them. And isn’t that, in a way, a beautiful thought? That even amid the most culturally over-scripted time of year, one might be free to say, “This is how I will find my joy.”

    Ultimately, Skipping Christmas resonates because it captures a truth we all feel at times. We cherish our communities and traditions, yes, but we also sometimes feel stifled by them. Grisham deftly satirizes the pressure to conform while simultaneously succumbing to a conventional resolution – a duality that leaves a reflective reader with mixed feelings. Perhaps the true message sits between the lines: we yearn for freedom, yet we fear the loneliness it can bring; we crave belonging, yet we chafe at the obligations it carries. The Kranks’ aborted rebellion throws into relief this delicate balance in our own lives.

    As the imaginary snow globe of Hemlock Street settles, one cannot help but feel a pang of empathy for Luther and Nora’s lost Caribbean Christmas. It’s a poignant reminder that, for all our jokes about dodging the in-laws or skipping the stressful parts of the holidays, most of us ultimately comply – out of love, out of duty, out of habit. We smile, we go along, and it is often good. But deep down, we know that the choice mattered. The Kranks had a glimpse of a life unburdened by expectation, and though they didn’t grasp it fully, that glimpse is not lost on us. It suggests a profoundly personal question especially relevant during the holidays: What do I want this time of year to be, and do I have the courage to make it so?

    In the end, Skipping Christmas leaves us with a curious kind of hope. Not the typical sugar-cookie-sweet hope of most Christmas tales, but a subtler hope that maybe one day we can all find a balance between the warmth of tradition and the breath of freedom. It’s the hope that next time we feel the urge to do something differently – to honor our own truth, even if it disappoints others – we’ll remember Luther Krank standing on the brink of that airplane gangway. We’ll remember that the world almost made him forget that his Christmas belonged to him. And perhaps we’ll take a step forward on our own path, carrying with us the understanding that the best holiday, the best life, is one defined not by obligation, but by authentic choice.

    In that final view, the Kranks’ story is more than a holiday comedy – it’s a gentle nudge to cherish our loved ones and our freedom, and to realize that true happiness might just be, like a bright star on a winter’s night, something we must define for ourselves.

  • Zoon Politikón

    Is politics a necessary evil?

    Rather than embracing this cynical framing, we might reconsider the very nature of political life through different philosophical traditions.

    Aristotle famously described humans as “zoon politikon”—political animals by nature. This wasn’t a reluctant admission but a celebration of our fundamental character. For Aristotle, participation in the polis (the city-state) wasn’t some burdensome obligation but the fulfillment of our highest potential. To be fully human meant engaging with others in deliberation about shared concerns and collective flourishing. Our political nature isn’t something we must grudgingly accept but rather something that defines our very humanity. We are beings who naturally form communities and must therefore make decisions together about how to live well within them.

    Perhaps our modern disillusionment stems partly from the word “politics” itself, which now carries centuries of accumulated negative associations. The term conjures images of manipulation, corruption, and endless partisan conflict. What if we substituted this loaded terminology with the simpler concept of “public life”? This reframing helps us recognize that what we’re really discussing is how we organize ourselves to live together peacefully and productively. Public life encompasses the necessary conversations, compromises, and collective decisions that make shared existence possible. Viewed this way, political engagement isn’t an evil to be tolerated but the essential work of creating communities where all can thrive.

    The Confucian tradition offers additional insight, emphasizing that harmonious community life begins with self-cultivation and ripples outward through family and social relationships. For Confucius, good governance wasn’t primarily about institutions or procedures but about virtue. The exemplary person (junzi) developed personal integrity that naturally influenced others. Social order emerged not through coercive power but through ritual, propriety, and reciprocal obligations freely embraced. The Confucian vision reminds us that public life at its best isn’t primarily about power struggles but about creating relationships of mutual respect and responsibility that sustain community well-being.

    Politics becomes “evil” only when we reduce it to a cynical game of domination. When we return to the ancient wisdom that sees our political nature as fundamental to our humanity, when we reframe politics as simply our shared public life, and when we ground our approach in the cultivation of virtue and relationship, we can recognize political engagement as not just necessary but potentially noble. The question isn’t whether we can avoid politics but whether we can transform it into an authentic expression of our deepest human capacity for living together in peace and justice.

  • Liberty at the Precipice

    A dramatic meditation on six dark auguries

    “The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.”
    — Hegel

    The dusk is thickening over the Western democracies. Their parliaments still convene, ballots are still cast, and constitutions yet adorn museum-lit vitrines; but somewhere in the glow of liquid-crystal screens the old promises of liberty are being quietly rewritten. Six contemporary thinkers—Varoufakis, Postman, Mbembe, Chomsky, Forrester, and Wolin—have each raised a different lamp to the gathering night. When their beams are allowed to overlap, they project an unsettling silhouette of the future. Let us follow those lights one by one, and watch how the figure of “freedom” changes shape.


    1. Varoufakis’ Technofeudalism: The New Lords of the Cloud

    Yanis Varoufakis argues that capitalism has molted. No longer a system of competitive markets exchanging commodities, it has become technofeudal: a realm where cloud capital—the softwares, platforms, and data vaults—replaces land, and cloud rents replace profits.

    • Ownership is concentrated in “fiefdoms” (Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta) that levy tolls on every digital crossing.
    • Labourers do not sell labour so much as they perform obligations inside gated architectures: gig workers, app developers, even casual scrollers whose clicks mint behavioural surplus.
    • Law, tax codes, and infrastructure bend around the needs of these barons, just as medieval kings prorogued roads and rivers for dukes.

    Implication for liberty: freedom of enterprise and speech migrates from public law to private terms of service. One may roam the global village, but only so far as a moderator’s algorithmic gaze allows. Habeas corpus is replaced by habeas data: the right of the platform to detain your metadata in perpetuity.


    2. Postman’s “Amusing Ourselves to Death”: The Carnival That Swallows the Polis

    Neil Postman, writing before smartphones were dreamt, warned that television’s logic would drown politics in entertainment. The prophecy is now all-encompassing:

    • Images arrive in floods, “breaking news” every quarter-hour, flattening tragedy and trivia into the same spectacle.
    • The citizen is refashioned as a dopamine seeker; sustained attention—democracy’s oxygen—is asphyxiated by the scroll.
    • Because the electorate’s appetite is measured in micro-seconds, policy is drafted as pageant, not programme.

    Implication for liberty: A public that cannot remember yesterday cannot defend tomorrow. Constitutional guarantees survive on paper, yet the capacity to desire them withers. Where Tocqueville feared gentle despotism, Postman discerns the softer doom of jocular anesthesia.


    3. Mbembe’s Necropolitics: Zones of Perishable Life

    Achille Mbembe extends Foucault’s biopolitics into the domain where sovereignty chooses not how to cultivate life, but whom it may abandon to death. In the West this is often exported:

    • Refugees drown at fortified maritime borders;
    • Supply-chain labourers inhale toxic dust beyond the visible perimeter;
    • “Essential workers” in pandemics clock in beneath banners praising their heroism while lacking basic protections.

    Implication for liberty: Freedom becomes geographically and racially partitioned. Aerial liberties over Silicon Valley coexist with aerostat surveillance over Gaza; each presupposes the other. The right to life—the bedrock upon which the right to liberty stands—turns conditional, and so liberty erodes from below like foundations gnawed by tides.


    4. Chomsky’s Necessary Illusions: The Alchemy of Consent

    Noam Chomsky’s media critique reminds us that propaganda in democracies is not shouted; it is manufactured through selection, framing, and repetition.

    • Ownership of media clusters with ownership of lobbyists and think tanks;
    • Debate is bounded by the “thinkable,” while genuine alternatives are dismissed as naïve or extremist;
    • Citizens are presented a menu choice after the entrée has already been cooked.

    Implication for liberty: The ballot box offers choice without voice. The form of freedom remains—campaigns, editorials, opinion polls—but substance is continuously skimmed away like cream from milk, leaving a watery liberalism that can be drunk without risk by the powerful.


    5. Forrester’s Economic Horror: The Market without Jobs

    Viviane Forrester saw the globalisation of the 1990s birthing a paradox: soaring productivity coupled with evaporating employment.

    • Automation, off-shoring, and just-in-time logistics produce surpluses with ever fewer workers;
    • Welfare states, designed for cyclical unemployment, crack under structural redundancy;
    • A new caste of surplus people emerges—formally free, materially shackled.

    Implication for liberty: Classical liberalism equated freedom with the right to sell one’s labour. When labour is no longer wanted, liberty mutates into the right to hustle eternally—Uber by day, Etsy by night—under permanent precarity. Debt, not prison bars, becomes the new fetter.


    6. Wolin’s Inverted Totalitarianism: Governance by Managed Democracy

    Sheldon Wolin’s chilling coinage describes a system where corporate power usurps political life without the theatrical violence of 20th-century dictatorships.

    • Security agencies partner with tech firms, blurring public and private sovereignty;
    • Elections are ritual confirmations of elite consensus, not engines of change;
    • Citizens are spectators, politics a branded spectacle, dissent a demographic niche.

    Implication for liberty: The tyrant is no longer a moustached figure on a balcony but a placid circuitry ensuring that disruptive wills are absorbed or silenced long before they reach quorum. Totalitarianism is inverted: people are not coerced to idolise the state; they are coaxed to ignore it.


    Constellations: How the Six Lenses Interlock

    1. Varoufakis supplies the economic infrastructure (platform serfdom).
    2. Postman supplies the cultural superstructure (spectacular distraction).
    3. Mbembe exposes the sacrificial underside (zones of expendable life).
    4. Chomsky shows the linguistic machinery (manufactured consent).
    5. Forrester reveals the social fallout (precariat and redundant multitudes).
    6. Wolin maps the constitutional outcome (hollowed republic, corporate sovereignty).

    Together they describe a self-reinforcing circuit:

    Technofeudal platforms harvest data → Entertainment media lulls critique → Necropolitical frontiers externalise violence → Illusions manage consent at home → Jobless growth multiplies desperation → Inverted totalitarian governance stabilises the arrangement … which further empowers the platforms that began the cycle.


    Can the Circle Be Broken?

    1. Digital commons legislation could dissolve platform fiefdoms, but lobbyists writing “necessary” tech policy are the very vassals of those lords.
    2. Public-interest media could counter Postman’s spectacle, but attention itself is colonised by algorithms optimised for outrage and mirth.
    3. Transnational human-rights regimes could confront necropolitics, yet those regimes depend on the very powers deploying lethal peripheries.
    4. Education in critical media literacy could puncture necessary illusions, but curricula are increasingly outsourced to corporate ed-tech.
    5. Universal basic income could answer economic horror, but fiscal imagination is bounded by deficit phobias fanned by rentier classes.
    6. Constitutional reform could curb inverted totalitarianism, but such reforms require the mass mobilisation that the preceding forces relentlessly disperse.

    Hope, then, must recruit new energies: unions that span borders and sectors, whistle-blowers inside the algorithmic fortresses, artists capable of holding attention long enough for truth to ferment, and jurists who dare draft rights for the twenty-first-century subject—rights to data self-determination, to dignified redundancy, to the slowness indispensable for thought.


    Epilogue: The Flame and the Screen

    Liberty in the West was once pictured as a torch raised high. To keep that fire, citizens gathered in forums, argued, voted, sometimes bled. Today the torchlight competes with a trillion tiny LEDs, each promising easier warmth. The danger is not that the flame will be snuffed out in a single gust of tyranny, but that we will cease to notice its dimming, amused and scrolling beneath the neon canopy of our own captivity.

    Yet dusk is not night. The owl that sees in darkness has already taken flight, carrying these six grim insights on its wings. If we dare to look up, to read the shapes it traces across the fading sky, we may still decide that liberty is worth the costlier light of day.

  • Western Medical Science in Descartes’s Lifetime (1596–1650)

    During the lifetime of René Descartes, Western medical science was in a period of profound transition. The first half of the 17th century saw the clash of ancient medical doctrines with new discoveries and philosophies emerging from the Scientific Revolution. Traditional Galenic medicine, based on the balance of the four humors, still dominated medical practice. At the same time, pioneering physicians and natural philosophers were laying the groundwork for modern medicine through anatomical studies, experimental methods, and new theoretical frameworks. Below is an extensive overview of the status of Western medical science in Descartes’s era, highlighting both enduring traditions and revolutionary changes.

    The Dominance of Galenic Tradition and Humoral Theory

    For centuries leading up to 1600, European medicine was grounded in the teachings of Galen and Hippocrates. Health was thought to depend on a harmonious balance of the four humors – blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile – each associated with elemental qualities and organs. Disease, in this view, resulted from an excess or deficiency of a humor, and treatments aimed to “rebalance” the body’s humors. Physicians prescribed bloodletting, purging, emetics, and other so-called “heroic” therapies to shock the body back into equilibrium. Remedies were often guided by Galenic principles: for example, a “hot” illness might be treated with a “cold” herb, following the belief in opposites restoring balance. This holistic humorism was deeply ingrained in medical theory and practice well into the 17th century – Galenic medicine had persisted “from the time of the ancient Greeks to the start of the industrial era” as a working system.

    Medical education around 1600 reinforced this classical outlook. Learned medicine in European universities still relied on ancient authorities’ texts, especially Galen’s writings and Arabic commentaries like Avicenna’s Canon. Aspiring physicians memorized Latin treatises on theorica (physiology and causes of disease) and practica (diagnosis and treatment of illnesses). Scholarly medicine valued theory, but by the late Renaissance there was increasing emphasis on practical knowledge of diseases (nosology) and bedside experience. Still, the university curriculum remained heavily traditional. The status of university physicians was high – they formed an elite, often licensed by guilds or colleges (for example, London’s Royal College of Physicians, established in 1518). By contrast, hands-on healers like barber-surgeons, apothecaries, and midwives occupied lower rungs in the medical hierarchy, despite the essential services they provided.

    Outside academic circles, ordinary people often relied on folk medicine and household remedies. Herbal lore remained important; indeed, many learned physicians themselves used extensive herbals when prescribing drugs. Astrology and superstition also survived at the fringes of care: some practitioners timed treatments by the stars, and even high-ranking physicians might entertain notions like the “royal touch” – the belief that a king’s touch could cure scrofula (tubercular neck swellings). Overall, at the dawn of the 17th century, Western medicine was still rooted in its medieval past, and humoral theory provided the overarching framework for understanding health and disease.

    Renaissance Anatomical Revolution and Its Impact

    Despite the conservative backdrop, the Renaissance had already planted seeds of change in medicine, particularly through advances in anatomy. A landmark event occurred in 1543, a few decades before Descartes’s birth, when Andreas Vesalius published De humani corporis fabrica (“On the Fabric of the Human Body”). Vesalius’s masterful illustrated atlas, based on his own dissections of human cadavers, “operated a sort of revolution within the medical sphere”, breaking the long-held dominance of the Galenic anatomical model. By directly observing and dissecting human bodies, Vesalius and his contemporaries exposed many errors in Galen’s anatomy (which had been derived from animal dissection). This Vesalian revolution “interrupted the long and widely accepted hegemony of the Hippocratic-Galenic model” in anatomy. For example, Vesalius showed that the human sternum has three parts (not seven, as Galen claimed from ape anatomy), and he challenged the idea that invisible pores in the heart’s septum allowed blood to pass between ventricles. Such findings were significant cracks in the edifice of ancient authority.

    By Descartes’s lifetime, Vesalius’s influence had permeated European medical education. Human dissection became a fixture of training for physicians in many universities, often conducted in newly built anatomical theaters (Padua’s famous anatomy theater opened in 1594). These dissections and judicial autopsies (post-mortems on the deceased) not only taught normal anatomy but also began to correlate clinical symptoms with internal pathology. Physicians could now observe “morphological changes of internal structures” corresponding to diseases observed in life. This early practice of pathological anatomy – linking lesions found on autopsy to illness – was a forerunner of modern pathology. It marked a shift from viewing disease purely as imbalance of humors to recognizing localized changes in organs.

    Other Renaissance anatomists built on Vesalius’s work. Realdo Colombo (1516–1559) discovered the pulmonary circuit – showing that blood travels from the right side of the heart to the lungs and then to the left side – improving upon Galen’s incomplete understanding of blood flow. Hieronymus Fabricius (1537–1619), who taught at Padua, described the valves in veins in 1603, noting their one-way nature. These venous valves puzzled Fabricius but provided a crucial hint to his student William Harvey, who would soon reinterpret the circulatory system entirely. The late 16th and early 17th centuries also saw better understanding of skeletal and muscular systems, often aided by artists and anatomists working together (as Leonardo da Vinci had earlier, and later Govard Bidloo or others would do).

    In the field of surgery, the Renaissance brought practical improvements. Ambroise Paré (1510–1590), a French military surgeon a generation before Descartes, had abandoned the harsh practice of cauterizing gunshot wounds with boiling oil. Instead, Paré applied soothing balms (like a turpentine, egg yolk and oil of roses mixture) and found that wounds healed better. He also reintroduced the use of ligatures (tying off blood vessels) during amputations to control bleeding, although in an era before antiseptics this could lead to infections. By 1600, Paré’s surgical writings and humane techniques were widely read, influencing surgeons of Descartes’s time to favor gentler wound care. These developments in anatomy and surgery set a precedent: direct observation and experience could correct and improve upon the wisdom of the ancients – a core idea that would blossom in the 17th century.

    The Scientific Revolution and New Medical Philosophies

    The intellectual upheavals of the 17th-century Scientific Revolution profoundly affected medical science during Descartes’s life. Thinkers like Francis Bacon (1561–1626) advocated for empirical methods – learning about nature through experiments and inductive reasoning rather than by venerating old authorities. This spirit spread into medicine. Indeed, “in the 17th century the natural sciences moved forward on a broad front,” and medicine was no exception. A growing number of physicians began to doubt doctrines that had been accepted for ages and sought new explanations grounded in chemistry or physics. As Bacon and Descartes discarded Aristotle’s four-element theory (earth, air, fire, water) in favor of new chemical understanding of matter, the old idea that health was governed by elemental balance started to lose its credibility. The door opened for new medical philosophies that challenged the humoral theory.

    One such challenge came from Paracelsianism, stemming from the influence of Paracelsus (1493–1541). Paracelsus was a radical Swiss physician-alchemist who predated Descartes but cast a long shadow over the 17th century. He had dramatically rejected the humoral teachings – reportedly even burning the books of Galen and Avicenna in a bonfire – and introduced a new approach that viewed illness as caused by specific chemical imbalances or external poisons, not an imbalance of humors. Paracelsus pioneered the use of chemicals and minerals in therapy, such as mercury for syphilis and antimony compounds for other ailments. By Descartes’s time, Paracelsian ideas had evolved into the “iatrochemical” movement. Physicians in this school sought to explain bodily functions and diseases in terms of chemical reactions: for example, digestion as a fermentation process, or health as a balance of acids and alkalis rather than hot/cold humors.

    Another new perspective was the mechanical philosophy championed by René Descartes himself and others. Descartes, better known as a philosopher and mathematician, had a keen interest in physiology and medicine. He believed the human body is essentially a complex machine, operating under mechanical laws. In his view, organs and muscles function like levers, pumps, and pulleys – concepts drawn from physics and mechanics. Descartes famously argued that animals are “automata” (living machines) devoid of souls, and that even in humans the body can be understood mechanistically, though he maintained the soul (mind) as a separate entity. This notion had wide repercussions in medical thought: it inspired a group of physicians known as iatrophysicists (or iatromechanists) who attempted to describe all physiological processes by physical principles. For example, they likened the heart to a pump and the lungs to bellows. Pioneers of this approach included Santorio Santorio in Italy and Giovanni Borelli, who applied Galileo’s physics to study the human body’s motions. Santorio (1561–1636) was especially innovative – he invented instruments to quantify bodily functions (such as a pulsilogarithm to measure pulse and a special scale to measure weight change after meals) and investigated metabolism by measuring “insensible perspiration” (continuous water loss through skin). In 1614 he published De Statica Medicina, detailing experiments where he weighed himself and his food to calculate how much matter the body secreted invisibly. This quantitative, measurement-based approach was revolutionary at the time, reflecting the new Cartesian zeal for measurement and mathematical analysis in science.

    As a result of these influences, Western Europe’s medical community in Descartes’s lifetime became split between conservative Galenists and reformers embracing new philosophies. University faculties sometimes saw heated debates – the “Galenico-Paracelsian controversy” raged in places like Germany, France, and England during the early 1600s, as traditional professors resisted the introduction of chemical remedies and theories. Galenic teachings were “challenged successively by Paracelsianism and Helmontianism” (after Jan Baptist van Helmont). Jan Baptist van Helmont (1580–1644) was a Flemish iatrochemist who built on Paracelsus’s ideas while adding rigorous experiments; he even coined the word “gas” and studied digestion with quantitative methods. Van Helmont founded the iatrochemical school’s base in Brussels, although his writings still contained alchemical mysticism. Later in the century, the iatrochemical approach was refined by figures like Franciscus Sylvius (1614–1672) at Leiden, who explained diseases in terms of acid-base chemistry, and in England by Thomas Willis (1621–1675), an anatomist and physician who used chemical treatments and contributed to neurology. On the other hand, the iatromechanical school (physicalists) counted not just Santorio and Borelli but also many followers of Descartes in France and the Netherlands; these doctors tried to reduce physiology to geometry and physics.

    Despite these divergent theoretical camps, they shared something important: a desire to replace older doctrines with a more “scientific” system. As one historian notes, there was “a general desire to discard the past and adopt new ideas” in 17th-century medicine. Many hoped to find a unifying, simple scientific theory that could guide all medical practice – whether based on mechanism or chemistry. Descartes himself believed that through understanding the laws of nature, medicine could become as certain as geometry. In his Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes famously wrote that improving medicine was one of his main goals, envisioning a future medicine that could “free us from an infinity of maladies, even perhaps the debility of old age”. He corresponded with physicians and engaged in dissections for over a decade, claiming “I doubt whether there is any doctor who has made such detailed observations as I” regarding anatomical studies. “I am now working to compose an abridgement of medicine, drawn partly from books and partly from my own reasoning,” he wrote to a colleague in 1638. Although Descartes never completed this grand synthesis (and withheld his Treatise of Man from publication after Galileo’s condemnation), his vision of a medicine grounded in indubitable scientific knowledge was emblematic of the era’s aspirations.

    It is worth noting that while new theories proliferated, superstition and unscientific practices did not disappear overnight. A “substratum of superstition still remained” in medicine throughout the 1600s. For example, Richard Wiseman, an eminent surgeon to King Charles II, affirmed belief in the monarch’s healing touch for scrofula even in the late 17th century. Likewise, learned men like Sir Thomas Browne (physician and author) could still insist that witches were real. Alchemical quests for panaceas and elixirs continued, and many remedies had no rational basis. Nonetheless, the critical difference by mid-century was that empirical science had secured a foothold in medicine: increasingly, the best medical minds argued that knowledge must come from observation, dissection, and experiment rather than ancient dogma.

    Breakthroughs in Anatomy and Physiology

    Amid this rich intellectual ferment, some concrete scientific breakthroughs greatly advanced medical knowledge during Descartes’s lifetime. Foremost among them was William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood, often cited as the single greatest 17th-century medical achievement. Harvey (1578–1657), an English physician, studied in Padua under Fabricius and absorbed the latest anatomical insights. Through a series of meticulous experiments and animal dissections, he came to understand that the heart works as a pump to move blood in a circuit around the body. In 1628 Harvey published Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (“An Anatomical Exercise on the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals”), which demonstrated that blood is pumped out from the heart through arteries and returns via veins in a closed loop. This overturned Galen’s 1400-year-old view that blood was continually synthesized in the liver and consumed by the organs. Harvey calculated the volume of blood the heart moved and showed it far exceeded what the body could produce anew; the only logical conclusion was that the same blood was circulating repeatedly.

    The response to Harvey’s work was mixed but pivotal. His findings “aroused controversy” – conservative physicians, steeped in Galen, argued against him without even attempting his experiments. Many clung to Galen’s idea of blood ebbing and flowing like tides or being absorbed rather than recirculated. Yet Harvey’s evidence eventually carried the day, especially as younger physicians repeated his demonstrations. By the mid-17th century, the circulation of blood was becoming widely accepted as a fundamental truth – “a landmark of medical progress” that exemplified the power of experimental method. Equally important, Harvey’s approach showed a new way of doing science in medicine: he relied on precise observation and scrupulous reasoning, drawing conclusions from experience rather than deferentially quoting old authorities. This empirical methodology, paralleling Bacon’s philosophy, would become a cornerstone of modern medical science.

    Harvey’s work also spurred further discoveries. One gap in his theory was the inability to see the fine connections between the arteries and veins. Harvey postulated the existence of tiny vessels – later named capillaries – to complete the circuit, but they were invisible with the naked eye. A few years after Descartes’s death, in 1661, Marcello Malpighi in Italy used one of the earliest microscopes to actually observe capillaries in a frog’s lung, thus vindicating Harvey’s prediction. Malpighi’s discovery showed how blood passed from arteries into veins via a network of microscopic vessels, and it also marked the birth of microscopic anatomy (histology). Although Malpighi was a young boy during Descartes’s lifetime (born 1628, the same year Harvey published De Motu Cordis), the development of the microscope had already begun. The compound microscope had likely been invented in the late 16th century in Holland, and Galileo himself improved one (he called it the “occhiolino”) by around 1624. Descartes, Galileo, and others were aware of the potential of lenses. However, it was only after mid-century that Anton van Leeuwenhoek and Robert Hooke truly revolutionized microscopy. Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723), a Dutch contemporary of Descartes (though much younger), would go on to report the first sightings of bacteria and protozoa in the 1670s, while Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) revealed the cellular structure of tissues like cork and plants. These developments were slightly after Descartes’s life, but their foundation was laid in the curiosity about the invisible world that arose in the 17th century. By 1650, the microscope was still a novelty, yet poised to open an entirely new frontier of medical science – one that Descartes did not live to see, but which was a direct extension of the experimental spirit of his age.

    Beyond circulation, other anatomical and physiological advances occurred. Harvey’s second book on embryology, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium (1651), broke ground in the study of reproduction and development. Although published just after Descartes’s death, Harvey had likely shared some insights earlier. He rejected prevailing ideas like spontaneous generation and instead carefully described chick development in the egg, laying a foundation for modern embryology. Others in mid-17th century also began systematically studying organ function: for instance, Thomas Wharton described endocrine glands (1656) and Thomas Bartholin in Copenhagen discovered the thoracic duct of the lymphatic system (1652). In 1620, the Italian anatomist Gaspare Aselli had already identified lacteal vessels (lymphatics of the gut). Such findings gradually eroded the old Galenic notion of physiology as movement of mystical “pneumas” or humors, replacing it with concrete descriptions of organs and fluids.

    It should be mentioned that Descartes himself attempted a comprehensive physiological treatise, L’Homme (“Treatise of Man”), which he wrote in the 1630s. In this work (only published posthumously in 1662), Descartes presented the human body as a machine and gave the first description of what we now recognize as reflexes. He explained, for example, how touching a hot flame would trigger a rapid, automatic withdrawal of the hand, without the intervention of conscious thought – a concept very close to our modern understanding of reflex action. This was arguably the first textbook of physiology in Europe, mapping out functions like circulation, digestion, sensation, and motion in mechanistic terms. Though Descartes stopped short of publishing it in his lifetime (fearing religious backlash for some of his ideas), manuscript copies circulated among intellectuals. His mechanistic physiology and emphasis on the pineal gland as the mind-body interface, while not empirically proven, stimulated debate and further investigation into neuroanatomy and bodily control.

    In summary, by 1650 Western medicine had gained a much clearer anatomical map of the human body and a nascent understanding of how major systems function. The circulation of blood was demonstrated, the true structure of organs was better known from dissections, and the stage was set for linking structure to function. This new knowledge did not immediately cure diseases, but it provided the scientific underpinnings for future progress. It also marked a dramatic departure from basing medicine purely on ancient books – discovery and innovation were now possible and celebrated.

    Medical Practice and Treatment in the Early 17th Century

    While scientific knowledge was advancing, everyday medical practice during Descartes’s lifetime remained a mix of old and new. Traditional remedies and procedures continued to be used widely, and effective new treatments were few. Bloodletting was still a go-to therapy for countless ailments – fever, inflammation, headache, etc. – under the rationale of removing excess blood (the “hot” humor) or calming the body. Physicians carried lancets and leech jars as standard equipment. Purging of the bowels with laxatives or inducing vomiting were common to expel supposed noxious humors. Such methods persisted in part because, lacking precise understanding of disease, doctors felt they must “do something,” and these interventions fit the humoral theory. Unfortunately, aggressive bleeding and purging often weakened patients further, but this would not be fully recognized until much later.

    Herbal medicine was another mainstay of 17th-century practice. Pharmacists (apothecaries) and physicians dispensed a vast array of plant-based concoctions: willow bark for pain, foxglove (in folk use) for dropsy, and so on – though the active chemical principles (like salicylates in willow or digitalis in foxglove) were not yet isolated. Many remedies came from medieval herbals or classical sources like Dioscorides. However, the 17th century also introduced new medicinal substances from global exploration and alchemical laboratories. A noteworthy example is cinchona bark (Peruvian bark), which Jesuit missionaries brought from South America to Europe in the 1630s–1640s. This bark, rich in quinine, was found to markedly reduce malarial fevers. By the 1650s it was known in England as “Jesuits’ powder”, available from apothecaries as an expensive but life-saving remedy. The Italian physician Ramazzini in the 17th century even lauded Peruvian bark as a discovery in medicine on par with the value of gold and silver from the New World. This was one of the few really effective specific treatments of the era, in contrast to the largely symptomatic or purgative treatments of humoral medicine.

    Likewise, chemical drugs were being tested and adopted. Antimony-based compounds (like “antimony wine” or emetic tartar) could induce vomiting or sweating and became popular remedies for various illnesses. These often originated from Paracelsian chemists. There was significant controversy around antimony: the Faculty of Medicine in Paris had banned its use in 1566 as poisonous, but by 1650 many practitioners were using it, and a public debate – the so-called “antimony war” – raged between conservative Galenists and Paracelsians. In 1658, when the young King Louis XIV survived a serious illness after being treated with antimony, the tide turned decisively in favor of chemical remedies, and eventually the prohibition was lifted. Mercury was another toxic substance routinely used – most famously in the treatment of syphilis, a disease that first struck Europe in the late 15th century. By the 17th century, mercurial ointments or elixirs were standard to treat syphilis (despite mercury’s dreadful side effects) because no better cure existed. These examples illustrate how therapeutics in Descartes’s time were still primitive and often as harmful as the diseases, yet innovation was slowly occurring through trial and error.

    Public health measures in this era were rudimentary. Europe suffered recurring epidemics of plague (for instance, outbreaks in 1603 London, 1629–31 northern Italy, and 1647–48 in Spain) with staggering mortality. Without knowledge of bacteria (the plague bacillus) or effective cure, authorities resorted to medieval tactics: quarantine of the sick, travel restrictions, burning barrels of tar or herbs to purify “miasmatic” air, and prayer. Cities had “pest houses” to isolate the ill, but doctors had no real tools beyond watching for God’s will. Descartes himself fled Paris in 1628 partly to avoid an outbreak. Smallpox was another dreaded killer – though it struck mostly children, its survivors often bore scars for life. In the 17th century, smallpox was ubiquitous and preventive inoculation (variolation) had not yet reached Europe (it would only be introduced from Turkey in the early 18th century). The lack of preventive measures meant that the average life expectancy was low (many people died before 40), and infant and child mortality were very high by modern standards.

    Surgical practice remained quite limited in Descartes’s time. Surgery was considered a manual craft, separate from the “learned” art of physic (medicine). Most surgeons lacked university education and instead learned through apprenticeships. They handled trauma, amputations, draining abscesses, setting fractures, and removing bladder stones. However, without anesthetics (not developed until the 19th century) or antiseptic technique (late 19th century), surgeries were excruciating and often lethal due to pain, shock, or post-operative infection. Surgeons like Paré had introduced important techniques as noted, and in 1628 the first human blood transfusion experiments were attempted (unsuccessfully) in France by Jacques Guillemeau and others using lamb’s blood – but these were isolated curiosities. Even something as basic as tooth extraction or bloodletting was often done by barber-surgeons with sharp tools, with no pain relief except perhaps alcohol or opium. Thus, despite scientific advances in understanding the body, treatment and surgical outcomes remained harsh by today’s standards. Many patients preferred to trust traditional healers or remedies for as long as possible before submitting to a surgeon’s knife.

    One bright development in practice was the increasing emphasis on clinical observation and documentation of cases. Physicians began writing more detailed case histories and attempting to classify diseases by patterns of symptoms rather than just treating imbalances. The English physician Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689), a younger contemporary of Descartes, exemplified this approach. Sydenham, sometimes called the “English Hippocrates,” advocated for careful observation of the patient and the course of illness, de-emphasizing complex theory and polypharmacy. He believed that physicians should “return to the bedside” and learn from the natural history of diseases. In practice, this meant identifying specific disease entities (like differentiating scarlet fever from measles, which Sydenham did) and choosing simple treatments that alleviate symptoms. This empirical, disease-focused approach was a reaction against the fruitless argument of iatrochemists vs. iatromechanists. By the late 17th century, thanks to Sydenham and others, there was a partial swing back to Hippocratic principles: valuing experience over dogma, and the idea that the physician’s duty is to aid the body’s own healing (“vis medicatrix naturae” – the healing power of nature), a concept even Descartes acknowledged.

    Medical Education and Institutions in Descartes’s Era

    During Descartes’s lifetime, the institutional landscape of medicine was also evolving gradually. Universities such as Padua, Leiden, Paris, Oxford, and Leiden were the centers for training physicians (as well as a few pioneering surgeons). Padua in particular stood out as a progressive medical school around 1600; it was there that many innovators studied or taught – Vesalius had lectured at Padua, and later Fabricius, Harvey, and Santorio all worked there. The curricula still taught Galenic theory but increasingly incorporated anatomy demonstrations and even discussions of new findings. In some regions, especially Protestant northern Europe, there was slightly more intellectual freedom to question tradition (for instance, Leiden University under Professor Franciscus Sylvius actively taught chemistry in medicine by mid-century).

    Professional organizations played a role in regulating practice: the Royal College of Physicians in London, the Collège de Saint Côme for surgeons in Paris, guilds for apothecaries, etc., which tried to maintain standards (often by enforcing adherence to accepted practices). These bodies sometimes resisted innovation – for example, the Paris Faculty of Medicine’s initial ban on chemical remedies shows the institutional conservatism that innovators faced. However, by mid-17th century, the winds were changing. In 1660 (a decade after Descartes’s death), the Royal Society of London was founded – a scientific academy where physicians and natural philosophers met to share research (several founding members were medically trained, like Christopher Wren and William Petty). Descartes himself had corresponded with informal networks of savants (e.g., Marin Mersenne’s circle) which were precursors to such societies. The first medical journals wouldn’t appear until the 18th century, but correspondence in Latin among learned men helped spread new medical ideas across borders. For example, Harvey’s discovery quickly became known in Europe through personal letters and scholarly visits even before it was fully accepted.

    Hospitals in the early 17th century were mostly charitable institutions run by religious orders or municipalities, meant for the poor, pilgrims, or those with no family – places like Hôtel-Dieu in Paris or various infirmaries. They were not centers of cutting-edge medical treatment; in fact, they often had dreadful sanitary conditions and served more as shelters. Wealthy patients were treated at home by private physicians. There was little in terms of organized public health beyond responses to epidemics. One noteworthy initiative was the quarantine stations (lazzaretti) set up in Italian port cities (like Venice) to screen and isolate travelers during plague times – an early form of public health policy which had started in the late medieval period and continued in the 17th century.

    An important social aspect was that women in medicine were mostly excluded from formal practice (with the exception of midwifery). Women could not attend universities or join physician colleges, but they served as informal healers, midwives, and nurses. In the 17th century a few women, like Louise Bourgeois in France (a royal midwife who published a midwifery textbook in 1609), gained recognition. Overall, however, the professionalization of medicine was a male-dominated enterprise at this time.

    Conclusion: A Field in Transition

    In sum, during René Descartes’s lifetime (1596–1650), Western medical science straddled the medieval and modern. On one hand, the daily practice of medicine was still governed by age-old traditions – the theory of humors, reliance on bloodletting and herbal concoctions, and the authority of classical texts. Remedies were largely ineffective or even detrimental, and people had little defense against scourges like plague or smallpox. On the other hand, this period witnessed remarkable progress in understanding the human body and questioning medical dogma. The Renaissance legacy of Vesalius and others had given physicians accurate anatomy. The Scientific Revolution ethos led Harvey to apply experimental methods, resulting in the discovery of blood circulation – “the supreme 17th-century achievement in medicine”. Across Europe, forward-thinking individuals embraced new models of knowledge, whether chemical or mechanical, demonstrating an unprecedented willingness to explain life processes in natural, rational terms rather than mystical ones. Descartes’s own mechanistic view of the body as a machine exemplified this new mindset and had significant repercussions in medicine, paving the way for fields like physiology and neurology.

    By 1650, the concept of disease was slowly shifting: physicians began to seek specific causes for specific diseases (foreshadowing germ theory), and they started to categorize diseases by clinical observation (foreshadowing modern diagnostics), moving away from treating the ill as a uniform imbalance of humors. The older generation still clung to humoral and astrological explanations, but a younger generation was “discarding the past and adopting new ideas”. In practice, patients of the time might not yet have benefited greatly from these scientific advances, but the stage was set for rapid progress. The mechanisms of circulation were known, anatomy was mapped, and the value of empirical research was established in medicine.

    In the years shortly after Descartes, these trends accelerated: the later 17th century would bring the first microscopes revealing micro-organisms, Sydenham’s solidification of clinical medicine, and the chemistry of Boyle and others inching toward biochemical understanding. Thus, the status of Western medical science in Descartes’s lifetime was one of dynamic transformation. It was a period in which medicine moved away from being an art based on ancient doctrines and towards becoming a science based on observation and experiment. The coexistence of bleeding bowls and microscopes, of herbal potions and mechanical models of the body, might seem paradoxical, but it captures the essence of that era. Western medicine was, by 1650, evolving rapidly – still burdened by its past, yet propelled by new discoveries that would eventually yield the modern medical science we know today.

  • Chomsky’s Necessary Illusions

    In Noam Chomsky’s work, particularly in his book “Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies” (1989), he explores how certain myths and misconceptions function as “necessary illusions” that help maintain existing power structures in democratic societies.

    The key necessary illusions Chomsky identifies include:

    1. The illusion of a free and independent media, when in reality media often serves elite interests through structural constraints, ownership patterns, and dependence on advertising revenue
    2. The myth that democratic governments primarily represent ordinary citizens rather than concentrated wealth and corporate power
    3. The illusion that foreign policy is driven by humanitarian concerns and democratic principles rather than strategic and economic interests
    4. The belief that economic systems like capitalism naturally serve the common good through “free markets” when they often concentrate wealth and power

    Chomsky argues these illusions are “necessary” from the perspective of power systems because they help secure public consent for policies that primarily benefit elites. His analysis draws heavily on earlier work with Edward Herman, particularly their “propaganda model” from “Manufacturing Consent,” which examines how media functions as a system for generating public compliance with established power structures.

    These concepts connect to Chomsky’s broader critique of how democratic societies manage popular consent through ideological systems rather than through more overt forms of control seen in authoritarian states.

    Chomsky provides numerous specific examples of these necessary illusions in practice:

    Media independence illusion:

    • Coverage of U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere showing systematic bias toward official narratives
    • Limited coverage of U.S.-backed human rights abuses (like in East Timor during Indonesian occupation)
    • The treatment of “worthy” versus “unworthy” victims in media coverage (extensive humanizing coverage of victims of U.S. adversaries versus minimal coverage of victims of U.S. or allied actions)
    • Corporate media’s narrow range of “acceptable debate” that rarely challenges fundamental power structures

    Democratic representation illusion:

    • Policy outcomes consistently favoring wealthy interests over popular opinion (citing studies showing minimal correlation between public preferences and policy except when aligned with elite interests)
    • The role of private campaign financing creating dependence on wealthy donors
    • Revolving door between government positions and corporate lobbying

    Humanitarian foreign policy illusion:

    • Supporting brutal regimes (Saudi Arabia, various Latin American dictatorships) while condemning human rights abuses selectively
    • The rhetoric of “promoting democracy” used to justify interventions with clear economic or strategic motives
    • The discrepancy between stated humanitarian goals and actual consequences in cases like Libya, Iraq

    Economic system illusion:

    • Portraying economic crises as natural disasters rather than systemic failures
    • Framing corporate subsidies as “free market” while labeling social spending as “government intervention”
    • The narrative of prosperity through deregulation despite evidence of increasing inequality

    Chomsky’s methodology typically involves detailed historical analysis comparing stated intentions against documented actions, and examining primary source government documents to reveal contradictions between public rhetoric and actual policy goals.

    Chomsky’s analysis draws on an extensive range of primary source documents and historical records to expose these necessary illusions:

    Government Documents:

    • Declassified National Security Council memoranda and planning documents (particularly NSC-68 and other Cold War strategy documents)
    • Pentagon Papers, which revealed contradictions between public statements and internal assessments of the Vietnam War
    • State Department policy planning documents from the post-WWII era, especially those authored by George Kennan
    • FOIA-obtained documents regarding U.S. involvement in Latin America, particularly Chile, Guatemala, and El Salvador
    • Congressional hearing transcripts and intelligence committee reports

    Diplomatic Communications:

    • Declassified diplomatic cables showing private vs. public positions on human rights issues
    • Embassy communications regarding economic interests in regions of intervention
    • Internal assessments of foreign governments contradicting public portrayals

    Media Analysis:

    • Systematic content analysis of major newspapers and television coverage during critical events
    • Editorial patterns in mainstream outlets like The New York Times, Washington Post, and major networks
    • Comparative analysis of coverage between similar events that receive different treatment based on U.S. interests

    Corporate/Economic Documents:

    • Corporate board meeting minutes and internal strategy documents
    • World Bank and IMF policy papers and conditional loan requirements
    • Trade agreement texts and negotiation documents
    • Business press publications that often speak more candidly about economic motives than general news

    Historical Records:

    • Transcripts from the Constitutional Convention showing founders’ concerns about limiting popular democracy
    • Colonial administrative records revealing the true nature of imperial projects
    • Historical government planning documents about managing public opinion

    Chomsky’s methodological strength lies in his meticulous cross-referencing of official documents with historical outcomes, identifying patterns of behavior that contradict official narratives. He frequently cites internal planning documents where elites speak more candidly about actual motivations compared to public justifications, revealing what he terms the gap between “necessary illusions” and documented reality.

    The Pentagon Papers provide some of Chomsky’s most compelling evidence of necessary illusions in practice. Here are key examples he frequently cites:

    Gap Between Public and Private Rationales:

    • While publicly claiming intervention in Vietnam was to defend South Vietnamese independence and prevent the spread of communism, internal documents revealed U.S. policymakers were primarily concerned with maintaining U.S. credibility and preventing a successful model of independent development outside Western economic control
    • Documents showed officials privately acknowledged the conflict was not about defending against external aggression but rather an internal Vietnamese struggle in which the U.S. had inserted itself

    Deliberate Deception:

    • The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, used to justify major escalation, was revealed to be dramatically misrepresented to Congress and the public
    • Internal assessments indicating the war was unwinnable continued for years while public statements maintained optimism about military progress
    • Documents showed officials were aware bombing campaigns were ineffective militarily but continued them for political and psychological purposes

    Imperial Planning:

    • Papers revealed post-WWII planning that identified Southeast Asia primarily as a resource area to be integrated into the U.S.-dominated economic system
    • The threat of an independent Vietnam was characterized in economic terms – the “domino theory” was about economic models rather than military conquest

    Disregard for Vietnamese Self-Determination:

    • While claiming to support Vietnamese democracy, internal documents revealed U.S. opposition to elections mandated by the Geneva Accords because intelligence indicated Ho Chi Minh would win approximately 80% of the vote
    • Evidence that the U.S. installed and maintained dictatorial regimes in South Vietnam despite rhetoric about democracy

    Policy Continuity Across Administrations:

    • Documents showed remarkable continuity in Vietnam policy across Democratic and Republican administrations despite public perception of differences
    • Revealed bipartisan commitment to the same fundamental objectives regardless of public messaging differences

    Chomsky used these revelations to demonstrate how the “necessary illusion” of America defending democracy against aggression contradicted internal government understandings. He argued the Papers exposed not just lies about specific events, but a fundamentally different conception of America’s role and motives than what was presented to the public – revealing the systematic nature of necessary illusions in foreign policy.

    The Pentagon Papers provide some of Chomsky’s most compelling evidence of necessary illusions in practice. Here are key examples he frequently cites:

    Gap Between Public and Private Rationales:

    • While publicly claiming intervention in Vietnam was to defend South Vietnamese independence and prevent the spread of communism, internal documents revealed U.S. policymakers were primarily concerned with maintaining U.S. credibility and preventing a successful model of independent development outside Western economic control
    • Documents showed officials privately acknowledged the conflict was not about defending against external aggression but rather an internal Vietnamese struggle in which the U.S. had inserted itself

    Deliberate Deception:

    • The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, used to justify major escalation, was revealed to be dramatically misrepresented to Congress and the public
    • Internal assessments indicating the war was unwinnable continued for years while public statements maintained optimism about military progress
    • Documents showed officials were aware bombing campaigns were ineffective militarily but continued them for political and psychological purposes

    Imperial Planning:

    • Papers revealed post-WWII planning that identified Southeast Asia primarily as a resource area to be integrated into the U.S.-dominated economic system
    • The threat of an independent Vietnam was characterized in economic terms – the “domino theory” was about economic models rather than military conquest

    Disregard for Vietnamese Self-Determination:

    • While claiming to support Vietnamese democracy, internal documents revealed U.S. opposition to elections mandated by the Geneva Accords because intelligence indicated Ho Chi Minh would win approximately 80% of the vote
    • Evidence that the U.S. installed and maintained dictatorial regimes in South Vietnam despite rhetoric about democracy

    Policy Continuity Across Administrations:

    • Documents showed remarkable continuity in Vietnam policy across Democratic and Republican administrations despite public perception of differences
    • Revealed bipartisan commitment to the same fundamental objectives regardless of public messaging differences

    Chomsky used these revelations to demonstrate how the “necessary illusion” of America defending democracy against aggression contradicted internal government understandings. He argued the Papers exposed not just lies about specific events, but a fundamentally different conception of America’s role and motives than what was presented to the public – revealing the systematic nature of necessary illusions in foreign policy.